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I V 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals' jurisdiction over this appeal arises under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This appeal presents the following issues for review: 
1. Did the trial court err in granting Defendants three times as many 
peremptory challenges as those given to the Plaintiff? 
Standard of Review: In deciding to give Defendants twelve 
peremptory challenges, the trial court interpreted Rule 47 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Utah law, an interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law to which the appellate court gives no deference, rather it 
reviews the interpretation for correctness. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 
1357 (Utah 1993); Ward v. Richfield City, 793 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
The correctness standard means "the appellate court decides the matter for 
itself. . . ." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Plaintiff/Appellant preserved this issue in the trial court with a 
Motion to Limit the Defendants' Number of Peremptory Challenges. 
(Exhibit 1, Motion, R 381). The trial court denied the Motion. (Exhibit 2, 
Transcript July 15, 1993). 
2. Did the trial court err in finding Defendant Pleasant Grove City 0% 
negligent? 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a jury's verdict, the appellate 
court will reverse the judgment if it lacks substantial evidence to support 
it. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). See also, 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985) (evidence did not 
support jury's finding of constructive fraud); Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 
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787 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah App. 1990) (no substantial evidence existed to 
show plaintiff was negligent). 
Plaintiff/Appellant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict or in the Alternative for a New Trial, preserves this issue. (Motion, 
R. 832). The court denied Ms. Carrier's Motion. (Order, October 29, 1993, 
R . 1 0 0 3 . 
3. Did the trial court err in refusing to give the right-of-way, jury 
instruction offered by counsel for Ms. Carrier? 
Standard of Review. The appellate court reviews a trial court's 
refusal to give a jury instruction for correctness. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc., v. 
11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447,452 (Utah 1993). The correctness standard 
means that "the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not 
defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law." Pena, 869 
P.2d at 936 (Utah 1994). 
Plaintiff/Appellant preserved this issue by objecting to the Court's 
refusal to give the requested instruction. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2532, line 
24 to 2533, line 17). Plaintiff/Appellant also objected to the court's 
decision to give a different right-of-way instruction. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 
#2538, lines 2-10). 
4. Did the trial court err in allowing rebuttal witness Newell Knight 
to improperly testify? 
Standard of Review: The appellate court will reverse a ruling on 
cross-examination when the trial court abused its discretion. Whitehead v. 
American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 923-24 (Utah 1990). 
Plaintiff/Appellant preserved this issue by objecting. (Transcript 
Vol. X-R. #2439, lines 5-14; #2478 lines 8-12; # 2524, line 18 to #2525 
line 8). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Jurors. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47 (1992). 
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or 
two jurors in addition to the regular panel be called and 
impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the 
order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to 
the time the jury retires to consider its verdict become unable 
or disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall 
be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same 
qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and 
challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same 
functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal 
jurors. An alternate juror shall be discharged after the jury 
retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors 
are called each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in 
addition to those otherwise allowed. The additional 
peremptory challenge may be used only against an alternate 
juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law 
shall not be used against the alternates. 
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge 
is an objection made to the trial jurors and may be directed (1) 
to the panel or (2) to an individual juror. Either party may 
challenge the jurors, but where there are several parties on 
either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made. 
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of 
peremptory challenges. The challenges to individual jurors 
are either peremptory or for cause. Each party shall be 
entitled to three peremptory challenges except as provided 
under Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. 
Right-of-way between vehicles -- unregulated intersection. Utah 
Code Annotated § 41-6-72 (1992). 
(1) The operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection 
not regulated by an official traffic control device shall yield the 
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right-of-way to any vehicle that has entered the intersection 
from a different highway. 
(2) Except as specified in sub sections (3) and (4), when 
more than one vehicle enters or approaches an intersection 
from different highways at approximately the same time and 
the intersection: 
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic-control 
device; 
(b) is not regulated because the traffic-control is 
inoperative; 
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop signs, the 
operator of the vehicle on the left will yield the right-of- way 
to the operator on the right unless otherwise directed by a 
peace officer. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 32 (1992). Use of deposition 
in court proceedings. 
(a) Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a 
motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part of all of a 
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence 
applied as though the witness were present and testifying, may 
be used against any party who was present or represented at 
the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice 
thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions: 
(1) Any deposition may be used by any party 
for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the 
testimony of [a] deponent as a witness or for any 
other purpose permitted by the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
Who may impeach. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 607 (1992). 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including 
the party calling him. 
Mode and order of interrogation and presentation. Utah Rules 
Evidence, Rule 611 (1992). 
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(b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination 
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct 
examination and matters affecting the credibility of the 
witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit 
inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. 
Opinion on ultimate issue. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704 
( 1 9 9 4 ) . 
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in 
the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact. 
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the 
mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may 
state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did 
or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an 
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such 
ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Shirley Carrier filed suit on January 7, 1992 against Pleasant Grove 
City, William Roger Smith, and Mr. Smith's employer Pro-Tech Restoration. 
(Amended Complaint, R. 45). She alleged that Defendant Pleasant Grove's 
negligence in failing to report and replace a missing stop sign proximately 
caused a collision involving her and Defendant Smith. (Id. at 4-7, R 42-39). 
In addition, Ms. Carrier claimed that Defendant Smith drove his car 
negligently and proximately caused the collision. (Id. at 2-4, R. 44-42). As 
a result of Defendants' negligence, Ms. Carrier was seriously injured and 
sought to recover damages. 
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B. Course of Proceedings 
Defendants each filed answers to Ms. Carrier's claims, arguing that 
Ms. Carrier's negligence caused her injuries and denying their own 
culpability. (R. 13, 15, 59). The Fourth Judicial District Court tried the case 
before a jury beginning on July 15, 1993. Testimony continued from July 
15 through July 22, at which time the court recessed the case in order to 
hear other matters previously scheduled. (Transcript, Vol. VI-R. # 2085-
2086). 
Eleven days later the case resumed and the jury heard testimony on 
August 2 and 3, 1993. (Transcript, Vol. VII-VIII, R. 2101-2296). Again 
the court recessed the case and thirteen days later, on August 16 and 17, 
the trial continued. (Transcript, Vol. IX-X, R. 2297-2407). Another week's 
recess occurred and on August 24, 1993 closing arguments and jury 
deliberations finally took place. 
C. Disposition of the Case 
On August 24, the jury returned a verdict finding Shirley Carrier 60% 
negligent, William Roger Smith 40% liable, and Pleasant Grove City 0% at 
fault. (Judgment on Jury Verdict, R. 815). Ms. Carrier filed a Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for a New 
Trial on September 1, 1993. (Motion, R. 832). The court denied these 
motions on October 29, 1993. (Order, R. 1003). 
Subsequently, on November 12, 1993, Ms. Carrier filed a Motion for 
Relief from Judgment. (Motion, R. 1011). The court, on November 24, 
1993, also denied this motion. (Order, R. 1048). 
Ms. Carrier filed a notice of appeal on November 23, 1993. (Notice of 
Appeal, R. 1036.3). On December 23, 1993, Ms. Carrier sought summary 
disposition from the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court 
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declined to summarily reverse the case on January 10, 1994. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In Pleasant Grove City, on January 15, 1991, Defendant William 
Roger Smith drove his employer's vehicle into the path of Shirley Carrier's 
oncoming automobile. (Transcript, Vol. VI-R. #2041, lines 23-25). Ms. 
Carrier could neither stop nor avoid the resulting impact; she suffered 
serious injury. (Transcript, Vol. VI-R. #2042, lines 4-6). 
The collision occurred as Ms. Carrier was returning home, east on 
1100 North, a route she had used for the past six years. (Transcript, Vol. 
VI-R. #2040, lines 1-16). Ms. Carrier used 1100 North because the City 
had designed it as a "through" street or "collector" road with the right of 
way. (Transcript, Vol. IV-R. #1837, line 17 to # 1838, line 11; Vol. V-R. 
#1981, lines 6-16). 
Defendant Smith entered 1100 North from 500 East, going south. 
(Transcript, Vol. III-R. #1477, lines 11-13). For more than twenty years, 
that intersection had been controlled by stop signs on 500 East. 
(Transcript, Vol. IV-R. # 1839, lines 5-14,). However, at the time of the 
collision, the stop sign regulating Defendant Smith and all southbound 
traffic on 500 East was broken off and missing. (Transcript, Vol. II-R. 
#1403, lines 14-16). The stop sign across the street, restricting 
northbound traffic on 500 East, remained in place. (Transcript, Vol. III-R. 
#1486, lines 7-15). A homeowner near the intersection testified that the 
missing stop sign had been gone for one or two days. (Transcript, Vol. III-
R. #1709, lines 3-15; #1710, lines 1-14). 
On January 14, 1991, the day before the collision, Pleasant Grove 
sent a snow plow operator and city employee, David Frye, to "cinder" the 
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1100 North 500 East intersection. (Transcript, Vol. IV-R. # 1893, line 22 to 
# 1894, line 9). It snowed the next day and Pleasant Grove again sent Mr. 
Frye to plow 1100 North and the streets in that area. (Transcript, Vol. IV-
R. # 1894, lines 14-19). Although he could not remember his actions 
specifically on those two days, Mr. Frye testified that in plowing the roads 
he routinely would go through the 1100 North 500 East intersection six to 
nine times. (Transcript, Vol. V-R. #1928, lines 4-16 and #1931-33). 
Under Pleasant Grove City's written policy, snow plow operators 
must "[b]e alert for any roads [sic] signs that are knocked down and make 
sure they are put back up the same day." (Transcript, Vol. IV-R. #1183, 
line 12 to #1884, line 1). Mr. Frye had extensive knowledge of the city 
signs as a snow plow operator and as the individual responsible for 
maintaining and repairing Pleasant Grove's signs. (Transcript, Vol. IV-R. # 
1875, line 11 to #1876, line 3; #1877, lines 11-18). 
In addition to snow plow operators, the City charged all of its 
employees to watch for missing and damaged signs. (Transcript, Vol. IV-
R.#1877, line 2 to #1878, line 23). At trial, the chief of police, Michael 
Ferre, testified that in an average 24 hour period, police patrols pass 
though 1100 North 500 East between three and nine times. (Transcript, 
Vol. IV-R. # 1853, lines 5-14). Accordingly, on a day requiring snow 
plowing or cindering, Pleasant Grove City employees with the 
responsibility to look for missing stop signs, drove through the intersection 
where this collision occurred no less than nine and up to eighteen times. 
Pleasant Grove City Police Chief agreed that the City expected to 
identify a downed stop sign within minutes or hours and not days. 
(Transcript, Vol. IV-R. # 1855, lines 2-15). Failure to find a missing stop 
sign in that amount of time would mean the City's surveillance system had 
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been ineffective. {Id. at lines 16-19). Pleasant Grove's Public Works 
Director also agreed that under these conditions the City's system would 
have failed. (Transcript, Vol. V-R. # 1981, line 17 to #1982 line 4). At 
trial, Defendants' expert witness testified that the City did not fall below its 
required standard of care. (Transcript, Vol. VIII-R. # 2249, line 24 to # 
2250, line 8). Ms. Carrier's expert testified that it did. (Transcript, Vol. V-
R. # 2013, lines 7-13). 
Ms. Carrier filed suit against Defendants claiming negligence and 
seeking to recover damages. (Amended Complaint, R. 45). Each of the 
Defendants carried insurance from the same company, Farmer's Insurance, 
which arranged for counsel. (Transcript, Vol. II-R. # 1451, lines 2-7). 
Defendant Smith and Defendant Pro-Tech initially had the same attorney. 
Prior to trial, Defendant Smith changed his testimony and averred 
that his employer, Pro-Tech had asked him to alter his testimony 
concerning the accident. (Transcript, Vol. III-R. #1517, line 21 to #1518 
line 1). Defendant Smith said that Pro-Tech wanted to place more blame 
for the accident on Ms. Carrier. (Transcript, Vol. III-R. #1519, lines 12-
25). Pro-Tech denied these charges. (Transcript, Vol. IV-R. #1827, lines 
8-20). Consequently, Defendant Smith obtained separate counsel. 
None of the Defendants filed cross claims against the others. Nor did 
the defenses offered seek to place blame on any of the other Defendants. 
Accordingly, Ms. Carrier's counsel moved the trial court to limit the 
peremptory challenges granted so that each side of the controversy would 
have the same amount. (Exhibit 1, Motion, R 381). 
The court denied the motion, and meted out four peremptory 
challenges to Ms. Carrier while granting Defendants a total of twelve. 
(Exhibit 2, Transcript July 15, 1993). Ms. Carrier's counsel asked the court 
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to have Defendants state for the record the nature and extent of their 
adverse interests justifying the additional challenges. The court refused 
the request. (Id.). 
On the first day of trial, while impaneling the jury, the court asked 
that each party read the names of its witnesses to the potential jurors. 
(Transcript, Vol. I-R. #1140). After only one Defendant had introduced his 
witnesses, the court concluded, without regard to the other Defendants, 
that all defense witnesses had been presented. (Transcript, Vol. I-R. 
#1166). In fact, Defendant Smith had no separate witnesses, and Pleasant 
Grove City only had an additional one. (Transcript, Vol. I-R. #1166). 
At trial, Ms. Carrier testified that she could not see Defendant Smith 
approach the intersection since a tree and bushes lining 500 East blocked 
her vision. (Transcript, Vol. VI-R. #2058, lines 3-8). Because the 
shrubbery blocked her view, Ms. Carrier stated that she did not see 
Defendant Smith until she was about to enter the intersection. (Transcript, 
Vol. VI-R. #2057, lines 17-23). Ms. Carrier's vehicle struck Defendant 
Smith's van on the sliding door located behind the front passenger door. 
(Transcript, Vol. IV-R. #1739, line 23 to #1740, line 1). Ms. Carrier was to 
the right of Defendant Smith. 
All of the Defendants listed Newell Knight as an expert witness, 
however failed to call him during trial. (Transcript, Vol. I-R #1166; Vol. X-
R. #2439, line 22 to #2440, line 1). At the conclusion of Defendants' case, 
Ms. Carrier 's counsel sought to use Mr. Knight's deposition for 
impeachment and rebuttal purposes. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2438, lines 
18-23). Over Ms. Carrier's objections, however, the court allowed Mr. 
Knight to take the stand and testify. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2439, lines 5-
14). 
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On direct examination, Ms. Carrier's counsel generally restricted Mr. 
Knight to yes or no responses on what he stated at deposition. That 
testimony concerned the speed of the two vehicles (Transcript, Vol. X R. 
#2453, line 12 to #2467 line 18) and individual reaction time. (Transcript, 
Vol. X-R. #2467, line 21 to #2471, line 18). Defendant's cross examination, 
however, invited Mr. Knight to interpret Utah law (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 
#2477, lines 21-23) and pointedly asked Mr. Knight which party had the 
right of way. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2478, lines 15-18). Ms. Carrier 
objected and the court overruled. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2478, lines 8-14). 
Ms. Carrier tendered a jury instruction on the right-of-way statute, 
quoting Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-72(2). (Exhibit 3). This section 
states that when two vehicles arrive at an uncontrolled intersection at 
approximately the same time, the vehicle on the left must yield the right 
of way. Defendants proffered Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-72(1), the "first 
in time" rule. Subsequently, the court instructed the jury using both 
sections of the statute, over Ms. Carrier's objections. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 
#2532, line 24 to 2533, line 17; #2538, lines 2-10). 
The jury returned a verdict on August 24, 1992, finding Shirley 
Carrier 60% negligent, William Roger Smith 40% liable, and Pleasant Grove 
City 0% at fault. (Judgment on Jury Verdict, R. 815). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court improperly granted Defendants twelve peremptory 
challenges based on a misreading of Rule 47, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Under all of the rule's provisions, co-parties must exercise their 
peremptory challenges together. In Randle v. Allen, the Utah Supreme 
Court interpreted this to mean that unless a substantial controversy exists 
1 1 
between the parties they are not entitled to additional sets of challenges. 
862 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Utah 1993). A substantial controversy occurs when 
the parties file non-derivative cross claims against each other. Id. at 1333. 
In this case, none of the Defendants filed any cross claims. Moreover, 
none of the facts prove a substantial controversy between the Defendants. 
Therefore, the court committed reversible error when it granted 
Defendants eight more peremptory challenges than given to Ms. Carrier. 
The Ran die Court warned that granting one side too many 
peremptory challenges allows it to unfairly shape the jury to its advantage. 
862 P.2d at 1334. Eight additional challenges enabled Defendants in this 
case to do just that. The clear weight of the evidence demonstrated that 
Defendant Pleasant Grove City acted negligently in failing to discover and 
replace a stop sign down for one to two days. Nonetheless, the jury found 
that the City was 0% negligent. Because substantial evidence does not 
support that verdict, the Court should grant Ms. Carrier a new trial. 
A party is entitled to have her theory of the case presented to the 
jury in a clear and understandable way. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 
238 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, jury instructions which present the 
applicable law in a confused or incorrect manner should be reversed. In 
this case, Ms. Carrier offered an instruction which quoted directly from the 
applicable Utah statute and correctly set out the governing law. The court 
paraphrased the law and combined it with Defendants' instruction, thereby 
misleading the jury. 
Finally, the court improperly allowed expert witness Newell Knight to 
take the stand, testify outside the scope of direct examination, and to offer 
legal conclusions. Defendants designated and retained Mr. Knight as an 
expert witness and then declined to call him at trial presumably because 
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his deposition testimony agreed with Plaintiff's expert witness. At the 
conclusion of Defendants' case, Ms. Carrier offered Mr. Knight's deposition 
for rebuttal and impeachment purposes. 
The court overruled Ms. Carrier's objections, allowed Mr. Knight to 
take the stand, and then to testify on matters outside the material read 
from fhe deposition. In the course of his testimony, Mr. Knight referred to 
the Utah traffic code as a foundation for his opinion that Defendant Smith 
had the right-of-way at the intersection. Mr. Knight's legal conclusions fall 
outside permissible testimony under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704. 
Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 
P.2d 651 (Utah 1991) (The rule does not allow a witness to give legal 
conclusions). Because the court abused its discretion in improperly 
allowing Mr. Knight to take the stand and testify, the case ought to be 
reversed and remanded. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1: The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error When It Granted 
Defendants Twelve Peremptory Challenges. 
When Plaintiff/Appellant Ms. Carrier raised the issue of peremptory 
challenges, the trial court announced that it would give each Defendant 
three challenges plus one for the alternate juror. (Exhibit 2). In spite of 
Ms. Carrier's objections, the four peremptory challenges doled out to 
Plaintiff competed against Defendants' total of twelve. The first issue in 
this appeal is whether the trial court erred in exceeding the statutory 
number of challenges awarded to a party. 
A. The trial court erred in failing to comply with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 47. 
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A careless reading of Rule 47 might lead a court into mistakenly 
granting four peremptory challenges to every party in a multiple party 
case. Rule 47(e) provides that "[e]ach party shall be entitled to three 
peremptory challenges except as provided under Subdivisions (b) and (c) 
of this rule." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47 (1992). Subdivision 
(b) of the rule allows the court to give each party in the lawsuit an 
additional peremptory challenge to use against those called for alternate 
jury duty. Id. 
However, when there are several parties on either side, Rule 47(c) 
restricts the grant in subsections (b) and (e). It states that the multiple 
parties on one side "must join in a challenge before it can be made." Id. 
(emphasis added). Therefore, under the most reasonable interpretation of 
the entire rule, each side of the controversy receives only one set of 
peremptory challenges. 
Utah case law confirms this interpretation. Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 
1329, 1333 (Utah 1993) (Refusing to grant additional peremptory 
challenges to co-parties unless they are truly adverse); Sutton v. Otis, 68 
Utah 85, 141, 249 P. 437, 457 (1926) (same). See also, Annot. 32 A.L.R.3d 
747, 752 (1970)("Generally speaking, a statute which allows a specific 
number of peremptory challenges to 'each party' . . . has been construed to 
permit a single set of peremptory challenges. . . ."). 
In this case, the trial court failed to follow the general rule. Rather, 
over Ms. Carrier's objections, it awarded Defendants additional challenges 
as if each Defendant were a separate side of the lawsuit. When Ms. Carrier 
suggested that Defendants relate for the record why they merited 
additional peremptories, the court stated that it saw no need to have them 
do so. (Exhibit 2, at 2, lines 8-10). 
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B. The trial court erred in granting each Defendant four 
peremptory challenges when no cross claims had been filed. 
Under Utah law, co-parties may obtain additional sets of peremptory 
challenges only under specific circumstances. Recently, in Randle v. Allen, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: "[EJxtra peremptory challenges should be 
granted to multiple parties only if there is a 'substantial controversy 
between them respecting the subject-matter of the suit.'" 862 P.2d 1329, 
1332 (Utah 1993) (emphasis zdded)quoting Sutton v. Otis, 68 Utah 85,141, 
249 P. 437, 457 (1926). 
What is a substantial controversy within the context of Rule 47? The 
Randle Court spoke unequivocally when it stated that "In our view a 
'substantial controversy' exists when a party on one side of a lawsuit has a 
cross-claim against a co-party that constitutes, in effect, a separate, distinct 
lawsuit from the action existing between the plaintiffs and defendants." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In order for the trial court to award more than one set of 
peremptory challenges to a side, the co-parties must file cross-claims 
against each other. Moreover, the cross-claims cannot be merely 
derivative of the original claims. Id. That is, the cross-claims will not 
create additional sets of challenges if they only seek indemnification or 
contribution. In this case, Defendants filed no cross-claims. Therefore, the 
trial court erred when it awarded Defendants more than one set of 
peremptory challenges. 
C. Defendants lack substantial controversy 
Because Defendants filed no cross-claims against each other, under 
the holding in Randle they do not merit additional peremptory challenges. 
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Defendants may nonetheless attempt to argue that a "substantial 
controversy" exists between them. Even if the Court rules, despite Randle1 s 
unambiguous language, that a substantial controversy can exist without 
cross-claims, the facts in this case simply do not support Defendants' claim. 
In Randle v. Allen, Carl Allen's pickup truck struck Rosan Randle's 
car, resulting in her death. Mrs. Randle's husband sued Allen for negligent 
operation of his truck, and UDOT and Salt Lake County for negligently 
designing and maintaining the intersection. 862 P.2d at 1332. For his 
injuries, Defendant Allen cross-claimed against UDOT and the County, also 
alleging that the intersection had been negligently designed and 
maintained. Id, at 1333. 
As in this case, the Randle trial court allowed each party to exercise 
three peremptory challenges as well as one additional challenge for 
alternate jurors. Like the facts here, the plaintiff had four peremptory 
challenges while the three defendants collectively wielded a total of 
twelve. Id, at 1132. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendants 
with their extra peremptory challenges were able to shape the jury to 
their advantage. Id, 
In reviewing the case, the Utah Supreme Court noted that defendant 
Allen's separate lawsuit against the other defendants aligned his interests 
in choosing the jurors with both the plaintiff and the other defendants. Id, 
at 1333. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it granted Allen the 
additional challenges. Id, at 1334. 
On the other hand, UDOT and the County retained the same interests 
in defending against both suits. Id, at 1333. Indeed, in language that 
aptly fits Defendants in this case, the Randle Court described the common 
interests linking the two defendants together. It emphasized that 
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"[n]either made a claim for damages against the other or against Randle or 
Allen." Id. Moreover, "[b]oth asserted that Allen and Mrs. Randle were the 
proximate cause of the injuries." Id. In addition, "they had common 
interests in defending the claims against them." Id. Therefore, the Court 
ruled that UDOT and the County should not have been given an additional 
set of challenges. Id. at 1334. 
In this case, like UDOT and Salt Lake County in Randle, Defendants 
clearly operated under common interests. As already emphasized, they 
filed no cross-claims. In addition, the only defense theory put forth was 
Ms. Carrier's alleged negligence. Pleasant Grove City did not argue that 
Defendant Smith contributed to the accident; nor did Smith claim that 
Defendant Pleasant Grove's failure to replace the stop sign contributed. 
In fact, this case is stronger than Randle because Defendants have 
additional common interests. For example, two of the three Defendants 
worked for the same company. These two Defendants initially had the 
same attorney counseling them in this case. Moreover, the same insurance 
company carried coverage on each Defendant and it hired the attorneys 
representing them. 
Defendants might argue that a disagreement between Defendants 
Smith and Pro-Tech concerning the accident report creates controversy. 
This argument fails for two reasons. First, Randle requires that the 
controversy between co-parties be "substantial." 862 P.2d at 1332-33. 
This means that refusing to cooperate, attempting to shift liability to each 
other, resting defenses or claims on different sets of facts, or resorting to 
different legal theories simply is not enough. Id. Even hostility between 
the co-parties does not create a substantial controversy. Id. Here, 
Defendant Smith's averments that Defendant Pro-Tech instructed him to 
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lie, and Pro-Tech's denials, do not rise to the level of substantial 
controversy. 
Second, the controversy must effectually put the co-parties on 
different sides of the lawsuit, making them adversaries. 862 P.2d at 1333. 
In Randle, the Court held that defendant Allen's allegations that the other 
two defendants proximately caused his own injuries placed him in direct 
opposition. Id. By contrast, in this case, Defendant Smith's allegations and 
Defendant Pro-Tech's denials did not even cause a change in courtroom 
tactics. Specifically, both relied on the same theory and the same 
witnesses. 
Although Ms. Carrier raised the issue of peremptory challenges with 
the trial court several times, Defendants have yet to offer any facts 
proving that they operated on different sides in this controversy. 
Moreover, the trial court refused to require Defendants to state their 
adverseness for the record. Because Defendants are linked by common 
interests, "the trial court should have required [Defendants] to act jointly in 
exercising the three peremptory challenges allowed a side." 862 P.2d at 
1333. 
D. The trial court committed reversible error in awarding 
Defendants twelve peremptory challenges. 
The Utah Supreme Court has warned that, when awarding additional 
sets of peremptory challenges, a judge "must carefully appraise the degree 
of adverseness among co-parties." Randle, 862 P.2d at 1333.1 As Randle 
1 The trial court must evaluate the adverseness of co-parties without relying on how the 
parties might characterize their interests. Therefore, even though at the hearing counsel for 
Ms. Carrier did not dispute Defendant Pleasant Grove City's adverseness, the appellate court 
should independently decide whether any of the Defendants merited additional sets of 
peremptories. 
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explains, granting one side of the case additional challenges disadvantages 
the opposing side. Id. The disadvantage is particularly egregious when a 
large disparity exists in the number of challenges awarded to each side. 
Id. 
In this case, the trial court gave no indication that it carefully 
weighed the Defendants' adverseness. Responding to Ms. Carrier's motion 
to limit the peremptories, the court merely stated, "I feel that they are 
disparate enough, just by the nature of the case, to permit [granting the 
additional challenges]." (Exhibit 2, at 2, lines 8-10). Yet, the record reflects 
that the court did not see Defendants as truly adverse. 
While impaneling the jury, the court asked that each party read the 
names of its witnesses to the potential jurors. (Transcript, Vol. I-R. 
#1140). After only one Defendant had introduced his witnesses, the court 
concluded, without regard to the other Defendants, that all defense 
witnesses had been presented. (Transcript, Vol. I-R. #1166). The court 
saw Defendants as a unit. And, Defendants apparently acted as a uni t -
Defendant Smith had no separate witnesses and Pleasant Grove City only 
had an additional one. (Transcript, Vol. I-R. #1166). 
Without a substantial controversy between them, co-parties with 
additional challenges have the "opportunity to shape the jury to its 
advantage." 862 P.2d at 1334. In such cases, the Utah Supreme Court 
holds that prejudicial error occurs. No actual prejudice need be shown. Id. 
In Ran die, the Court reversed and remanded the case because the 
defendants received four extra challenges. In this case, the disparity is 
twice as large; the trial court allowed Defendants eight more challenges. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff/Appellant Ms. Carrier respectfully requests the Utah 
Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court and remand for a new trial. 
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Point 2: The Jury Erred in Finding Defendant Pleasant Grove City 0% 
Negligent. 
At the trial's conclusion, the jury, shaped by Defendants' additional 
peremptory challenges, returned a verdict finding Pleasant Grove City 0% 
negligent. It reached this result in spite of testimony by Pleasant Grove 
employees that the City had failed. The second issue in this appeal is 
whether Defendants presented '"substantial evidence . . . adequate to 
convince a reasonable mind to support [the jury verdict]. '" Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 861 P.2d 414, 428 (Utah 
1993) quoting First National Bank of Boston v. County Board of Equalization 
of Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). 
A. Marshaling the evidence 
Plaintiff/Appellant Ms. Carrier sued Pleasant Grove City claiming that 
it was negligent in failing to timely discover and replace a stop sign. Under 
Utah law, negligence means the failure to use reasonable care. Model Utah 
Jury Inst. 3.2, April 15, 1991. Evidence supporting the jury's verdict that 
Pleasant Grove was not negligent is as follows: 
1. City Police Officer Randy Shepherd testified that on the day of the 
accident the City had had a "lot of accidents that day." (Transcript, Vol. II-
R.#1443, lines 9-19). He also testified that when receiving numerous 
police calls, the officers patrol less and may not drive through every street 
during the day. (Transcript, Vol. II-R.#1446, lines 15-23). In addition, 
Officer Shepherd doubted whether he would have driven up 1100 North 
on the day of the accident unless there was an accident or police call. 
(Transcript, Vol. II-R.#1447, lines 15-23). 
2. Pleasant Grove City Police Chief, Michael Ferre, testified similarly 
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that a snowstorm limits patrolling. (Transcript, Vol. III-R.#1865, lines 11-
17). 
3. Pleasant Grove "sign man" and snow plow operator, David Frye 
stated on days with heavy snowstorms that not all of the streets would be 
plowed. (Transcript, Vol. V-R.#1937, lines 6-8). Mike Mills, Public Works 
Director also testified that on the day of the collision it was unlikely that 
the snow plow crew would have covered the entire city. (Transcript, Vol. 
V-R.#1991, lines 17-25). 
4. J. Bruce Reading, Ms. Carrier's expert witness, said that a 
"gracious" standard allows a city 24 hours to receive notification of a 
downed stop sign. (Transcript, Vol. V-R.#2016, lines 5-23). 
5. C. Arthur Guerts, Pleasant Grove's expert witness, claimed that 
Pleasant Grove's actions regarding the stop sign were within the accepted 
standard of care. (Transcript, Vol. VIII-R.#2250, lines 1-8). He also 
testified that any city's surveillance system is imperfect but that it will 
recognize a downed stop sign "within a day or two or three, perhaps even 
four." Any time longer than that would be too long. (Transcript, Vol. VIII-
R.#2250, lines 11-24). 
B. The jury lacked sufficient evidence in deciding that Pleasant 
Grove City was 0% negligent. 
A jury verdict must be overturned if it lacks sufficient evidence to 
support it. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 
1989). Legal sufficiency derives from Rule 52 (a) which provides that 
findings "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Doelle v. Bradley, 
784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989). A clearly erroneous finding is one that 
is against the clear weight of the evidence. Id. In this case, finding that 
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Pleasant Grove City had 0% fault in a collision involving a stop sign missing 
for one to two days is against the clear weight of the evidence. 
The evidence and inferences supporting Pleasant Grove's lack of 
liability falls in two areas. First, city employees testified that they might 
not have driven through the intersection the day of the accident and 
therefore would not have had an opportunity to look for the downed sign. 
Moreover, David Frye, the City "sign man" and snow plow operator for 
1100 North and 500 East, could not specifically remember if he plowed the 
intersection and surrounding roads that day. 
The clear weight of the evidence, however, proves that Mr. Frye had 
plowed the intersection and neighboring roads. His boss, Dennis Carter, 
Pleasant Grove Street Superintendent, stated that when he drove to the 
intersection at the time of the collision he saw that both 1100 North and 
500 East had been plowed. (Transcript, Vol. V-R.#1961, line 17 to #1962, 
line 8). Based on Mr. Frye's own testimony of how he typically plows those 
streets, he had been through the intersection at least six to nine times 
prior to the collision. (Transcript Vol. V-R. #1928, lines 4-16 and #1931-
33). If the stop sign had been down for two days then Mr. Frye's 
assignment to cinder the roads on January 14, 1992 would have taken him 
through the intersection four more times. With both days, he would have 
passed the missing stop sign ten to thirteen times. Any other city 
employee driving on 1100 North, a busy collector road, or 500 East, would 
simply add to that number. 
The second area of Pleasant Grove's evidence comes from expert 
witness C. Arthur Guerts. Mr. Guerts claimed that Pleasant Grove City had 
met the necessary standard of care. Basing his testimony on his 
experience with other communities, he argued that a city may reasonably 
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take up to four days to locate and replace a downed stop sign. 
Mr. Guerts' testimony, however, has several fatal flaws. First he 
asserts that in applying the four-day standard, it makes no difference how 
many times city employees travel past the missing stop sign. (Transcript, 
Vol. VIII-R.#2272, line 21 to #2273, line 18). Under Mr. Guerts' standard, 
therefore, a city employee could drive through the intersection every hour, 
indeed every minute, and the city would not fall below the standard of 
care until four days had passed. (Transcript, Vol. VIII-R.#2276, lines 13-
21. Testifying that the number of times through the intersection is "not 
relevant."). 
Mr. Guerts refused to budge from this position, even though he 
admitted that each time an employee drove the intersection, the City had 
another opportunity to discover the downed sign. (Transcript, Vol. VIII-
R.#2284, line 12 to #2288, line 7). He also admitted that under the 
circumstances he would be critical of Mr. Frye, the snow plow operator and 
sign man. (Transcript, Vol. VIII-R.#2288, line 18 to #2289, line 4). In 
fact, he would take corrective measures against Mr. Frye for his failure to 
discover the stop sign after passing through the intersection so many 
times. (Transcript, Vol. VIII-R.#2290, line 4 to #2291 line 16). Mr. 
Guerts' admissions belie his standard; the number of times employees pass 
the downed stop sign does become relevant. 
Second, Pleasant Grove City employees themselves do not agree with 
Mr. Guerts' assessment of the City's action on the missing sign. Thus, 
Public Works Director Mills acknowledged that if the sign had been down 
several days, the City's surveillance system would have failed. (Transcript, 
Vol. V-R.#1981, line 17 to #1982 line 4). Furthermore, Chief of Police 
Ferre emphasized that he expected the City to identify a missing stop sign 
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in minutes or hours and not days. (Transcript, Vol. IV-R.#1855, line 2-9). 
Finally, expert witness J. Bruce Reading directly contradicted 
testimony given by Mr. Guerts. He testified that given the number of 
times City employees actually went through the intersection, the City 
should have been aware of the missing sign. (Transcript, Vol. V-R. #2013, 
line 14 to #2014, line 11). Failure to discover the downed stop sign meant 
the City acted below the accepted standard of care. Transcript, Vol. V-R. 
#2013, lines 7-13). Mr. Reading emphasized the City's failure even if the 
stop sign had only been down one day. (Transcript, Vol. V-R. #2016, lines 
10-23). 
In reviewing the evidence supporting a jury verdict, the appellate 
court does not confirm on the basis of some evidence. See Peterson v. 
Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah App. 1991). Rather the jury's 
decision must be supported by substantial evidence. Reeves v. Gentile 813 
P.2d 111, 114-15 (Utah 1991) quoting Seybold v. Union Pacific R.R., 121 
Utah 61, 239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951). In this case, Pleasant Grove City failed 
to provide sufficient evidence that it had 0% negligence. Accordingly, Ms. 
Carrier respectfully requests the Utah Court of Appeals to reverse and 
remand the case. 
Point 3: The Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Give the Right-of-Way. Jury 
Instruction Offered by Ms. Carrier. 
" The well recognized general rule entitles a party to have his theory 
of the case submitted to the jury." Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 458 
(Utah 1981) citing Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 141, 140 P.2d 772 (1943). 
Moreover, the trial court must instruct the jury on the party's theory in a 
"clear and understandable way." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 
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(Utah 1991). Failure to meet these requirements is prejudicial error. 
Watters, 626 P.2d at 458. 
In this case, Ms. Carrier presented evidence that she and Defendant 
Smith arrived at the intersection at approximately the same time. Expert 
witness Rudolph Limpert testified that Ms. Carrier was approximately 66 
feet from the intersection when she first saw Defendant Smith's vehicle. 
(Transcript, Vol. IV-R. #1752, lines 21-25). Defendant Smith was 
approximately 53 feet away at that point in time. (Transcript, Vol. IV-R. 
#1753, lines 15-16). Ms. Carrier testified that because shrubbery lining 
500 East blocked her view, she did not see Defendant Smith until she was 
about to enter the intersection. (Transcript, Vol. VI-R. #2057, lines 17-23). 
Consequently, Ms. Carrier collided with Defendant Smith's van, hitting the 
sliding door located behind the front passenger door and establishing that 
Defendant Smith entered the intersection only tenths of a second before. 
(Transcript, Vol. IV-R. #1739, line 23 to #1740, line 1). Ms. Carrier was to 
the right of Defendant Smith. 
At the conclusion of trial, Ms. Carrier requested the trial court give 
the jury the following instruction: 
You are instructed that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-
72(2) provides: when more than one vehicle enters or 
approaches an intersection from different highways at 
approximately the same time [and] the intersection: 
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic-control 
device; 
(b) is not regulated because the traffic-control is 
inoperative; or 
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop signs, 
the operator of the vehicle on the left will yield the right-
of-way to the operator on the right unless otherwise directed 
by a peace officer. 
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If you find, after a preponderance of the evidence, that 
William Roger Smith was operating a motor vehicle in violation 
of the foregoing statute, such conduct creates a presumption of 
negligence. 
(Exhibit 3). 
This instruction quotes the statute and fairly instructs the jury as to 
Ms. Carrier's theory of the case: (1) Both drivers arrived at the 
intersection at approximately the same time; (2) from Defendant Smith's 
perspective the intersection was unregulated because "the traffic-control is 
inoperative"; and (3) Ms. Carrier was to Defendant Smith's right. 
Therefore, Defendant Smith had to yield the right-of-way. Moreover, from 
Ms. Carrier's perspective, the intersection was not unregulated. Relying on 
years of driving 1100 North and Ms. Carrier knew that she had the right-
of-way because traffic on 500 East, including Defendant Smith, was 
restricted by stop signs. 
Defendants argued, however that the jury ought to be given a 
paraphrase of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-72(1). This section provides 
that the driver entering the intersection first has the right-of-way. 
Although this instruction may present Defendants' theory of the case, it 
fails to recognize that the drivers approached the intersection with 
different statuses and obligations. 
Rather than give Ms. Carrier's requested instruction, the court 
paraphrased it and combined it with the one Defendants offered: 
When two vehicles are approaching an intersection at 
approximately the same time and distance from it, the driver 
approaching on the right has the right-of-way, and it is the 
duty of the driver approaching on the left to yield the right-of-
way. 
A driver entering an intersection first has the right-of-
way. However, a driver may not speed up to enter an 
26 
intersection first, nor may a driver take the right-of-way by 
entering the intersection slightly ahead of another driver. In 
order for a driver approaching from the left to take the right-
of-way, that driver must enter the intersection clearly ahead of 
the driver approaching from the right. 
(Exhibit 4, Jury Instruction No. 31, R. 781). 
Although the court gave Ms. Carrier's instruction in part, by 
combining it with Defendants' theory of the case, it failed to instruct the 
jury on Ms. Carrier's theory in a "clear and understandable way." 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238. Moreover, the court's instruction tended to 
mislead the jury as to the law applicable in this fact situation. See Biswell 
v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987). It simply did not allow for 
Ms. Carrier's state of mind, or that for more than twenty years traffic on 
1100 North had the right-of-way. Accordingly, Ms. Carrier respectfully 
requests the Utah Court of Appeals reverse and remand the case. 
Point 4: The Trial Court Erred by Allowing Newell Knight to Improperly 
Testify. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party can use a 
deposition for "any purpose permitted under the Utah Rules of Evidence." 
Rule 32(1) (1992). Furthermore, Utah's evidence rules state that "[t]he 
credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party. . . ." Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 607 (1992). Pursuant to these two rules, Ms. Carrier sought 
to have Newell Knight's deposition read into the record. (Transcript, Vol. 
X-R. #2438, lines 18-23). 
Defendants listed Newell Knight as an expert witness, and allowed 
Ms. Carrier to depose him prior to trial. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2439, line 
22 to #2440, line 2). While taking Mr. Knight's deposition, counsel for Ms. 
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Carrier discovered that Mr. Knight agreed almost completely with Ms. 
Carrier's expert accident reconstruction witness, Rudolph Limpert, Ph.D. 
(Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2458, line 1 to #2461, line 11). Although they 
continued to hold out the possibility of using Mr. Knight during trial, not 
surprisingly Defendants declined to call him as a witness. Instead, 
Defendants called Paul Thomas Blotter. (Transcript, Vol. VII-R. #2114, line 
10-13). 
At the conclusion of Defendants' case, Ms. Carrier's counsel attempted 
to introduce the deposition of Defendants' own witness, Newell Knight. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 32(1). Ms. Carrier intended to use the 
deposition to impeach Defendants' expert witness, Dr. Blotter, and 
Defendants' case in general. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 607; (Transcript, 
Vol. X-R. #2438, lines 18-23). Defendants had retained an expert who 
agreed with Ms. Carrier's version of the facts and then attempted to hide 
him from the jury. Over Ms. Carrier's objections, however, the court 
allowed Mr. Knight to take the stand and testify. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 
#2439, lines 5-14). 
On direct examination, Ms. Carrier's counsel generally restricted Mr. 
Knight to yes or no responses as to what he stated at deposition. That 
testimony concerned the speed of the two vehicles (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 
#2453, line 12 to #2467 line 18) and individual reaction time. (Transcript, 
Vol. X-R. #2467, line 21 to #2471, line 18). Defendant's cross examination, 
however, invited Mr. Knight to interpret Utah law (Transcript, Vol. X-R. 
#2477, lines 21-23) and pointedly asked Mr. Knight which party had the 
right of way. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2478, lines 15-18). Ms. Carrier 
objected and the court overruled. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2478, lines 8-14). 
The court erred first by allowing Mr. Knight to take the stand instead 
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of simply allowing his deposition to be read to the jury, as permitted by 
Rule 32(1) URCP; and secondly, by permitting him to testify outside the 
scope of direct examination. Rule 611(b) states in uncompromising 
language: "Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the 
direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness." 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 611 (1992). As the Utah Supreme Court 
emphasizes, an expert witness on cross-examination properly speaks on 
those matters opened up in direct examination. Whitehead v. American 
Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah 1990). 
While Rule 611 allows the court some latitude in ruling on cross-
examination, generally the court should restrict questions to the issues 
raised on direct. State v. Jerrell, 608 P.2d 218, 228 (Utah 1980). 
Moreover, the court must keep a certain amount of control over the 
discussion and not allow counsel to conduct a "fishing expedition" into any 
matter that might appear in the witness' deposition. State v. Clayton, 658 
P.2d 621, 623 (Utah 1983). 
The court attempted to justify its ruling allowing Defendants to lead 
Mr. Knight into areas completely unrelated to direct examination. It 
explained that it had permitted both parties to exceed the scope of 
examinations. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2525, line 9 to #2526, line 1). 
However, all prior instances referred to by the court had involved 
witnesses in the respective parties' cases in chief. Defendants had 
deliberately waived their right to call Mr. Knight; they specifically chose 
not to raise the right-of-way issue in their case. By overruling Ms. 
Carrier's objection, the court granted Defendants impermissible license to 
question the rebuttal witness. 
The court also erred in allowing Mr. Knight to give legal conclusions. 
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Utah courts have repeatedly rejected attempts by expert witness to testify 
on questions of law. See e.g. Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). In Davidson, this 
same Newell Knight appearing as an expert witness attempted to testify 
that an individual was negligent. In upholding the trial court's rejection of 
Mr. Knight's attempts the Utah Court of Appeals noted that Rule 704 
abolishes the per se rule against testimony on ultimate issues of fact. 813 
P.2d at 1231. However, the Court emphasized, the rule does not allow all 
opinions. Id. Specifically, the rule does not permit a witness to answer 
questions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach. Id. Nor 
does it tolerate legal conclusions. Id. 
In this case Mr. Knight referred to the Utah traffic code and then, 
over Ms. Carrier's objections, stated that Defendant Smith had the right of 
way. (Transcript, Vol. X-R. #2478, lines 15-18). Because Mr. Knight 
offered a legal conclusion, telling the jury what result to reach, his 
testimony should not have been allowed. Nor should the court have 
permitted Mr. Knight to testify outside the scope of direct examination. 
Nor should the court have allowed Mr. Knight to take the stand as all that 
counsel requested was to read portions of Mr. Knight's deposition to the 
jury. Accordingly Ms. Carrier respectfully requests the Utah Court of 
Appeals to reverse and remand this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in failing to follow the guidelines given in 
Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993). Because Defendants obtained 
three times as many peremptories as Ms. Carrier, they had the opportunity 
to shape the jury to their advantage. Not surprisingly, then, the jury 
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found, against the clear weight of the evidence, that Defendant Pleasant 
Grove City was 0% negligent. The court additionally erred in conducting an 
eleven-day trial over thirty-nine days, failing to submit Ms. Carrier's 
proposed jury instruction on the right-of-way, and allowing rebuttal 
witness Newell Knight to improperly testify. Accordingly, Ms. Carrier 
respectfully requests the Utah Court of Appeals to reverse and remand this 
case. 
DATED this 1^ 1 day of ^ A q a a v l U 1 9 9 5 -r 
c 
LYNN C.HARRIS 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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EXHIBIT 1 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF THE 
DEFENDANTS' PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
LYNN C. HARRIS (1382) 
SPENCE, MORIARTTY & SCHUSTER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200-B 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 375-0524 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
SHIRLEY CARRIER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba 
STONE CARPETS, WILLIAM and 
ROGER SMITH, 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
LIMIT THE NUMBER OF THE 
DEFENDANTS' PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES 
Civil No. 910400680 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
Defendants. 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 - -
COMES NOW the above-named plaintiff, and pursuant to the 
local rules, hereby files a motion limiting rhe defendants' number of 
peremptory challenges. At the recent pretrial conference in this 
matter when this issue was raised with the Court, the Court stated 
that it was inclined to allow the plaintiff to have three peremptory 
challenges and since there were three defendants, to allow them a 
total of nine peremptory challenges. 
The purpose of this motion is to bring to the Court's attention 
the inherent unfairness and disparity between the parties if the 
defendants are allowed to join together and have triple the number 
of peremptories allocated to the lone plaintiff. Specifically, it is the 
plaintiffs request that either the plaintiff be given an identical 
number of peremptory challenges as the defendants or to have the 
number of the peremptory challenges of the defendants reduced to 
equal the number allowed to plaintiff. Whether this be three, six or 
nine, it is plaintiffs position that the peremptory challenges must be 
reasonable in number and approximately equal between the two 
sides. 
I . 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
Rule 47(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states as follows: 
Challenge to individual jurors: Number 
of peremptory challenges. The challenges 
to individual jurors are either peremptory or 
for cause. Each party shall be entitled to 
three peremptory challenges, except as 
provided under subsections (b) and (c) of this 
rule. 
(b) Alternative jurors. . . . 
(c) Challenge to find; by whom made. 
A challenge is an objection made to the trial 
jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or 
(2) to the individual juror. Either party may 
challenge the jurors but where there are 
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individual parties on either side they must 
join in a challenge before it can be made. 
At first blush, one may assume that "each party" would require 
three peremptories allowed to the plaintiff and three each to the 
defendants for a total of nine. However, a review of the limited case 
law it changes that initial assumption. 
At 32 ALR 3rd. 747, "Jury: Number of Peremptory Challenges 
Allowable In Civil Case Where There Are More Than Two Parties 
Involved" contains an exhaustive collection of different state cases 
dealing with the number of peremptory challenges allowable and 
civil cases where there are more than two parties involved. Upon 
review of that annotation there are eighteen states which require the 
collective exercising of challenges. Under these states and their case 
law, each side gets only a limited number of challenges despite the 
number of parties. There are fifteen jurisdictions of the view where 
the interest of the parties are adverse, each party gets the full 
number of challenges. Only two states, Connecticut and Tennessee, 
require the plaintiff(s) and or the defendant(s) to join in their 
challenges no matter whether there interests are adverse. 
Under statutes similar to Utah's, nine jurisdictions require 
joinder. Some of these statutes are interpreted by case law to allow 
extra challenges, Utah is one such state. In Sutton v. Otis Elevator 
Company, 68 Utah 85, 249 P. 437 (Utah 1926), the Court construed 
"each party" to mean each defendant where the defendant's interests 
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were antagonistic. In Sutton, plaintiffs were injured in a hotel 
elevator incident. Plaintiff sued the hotel and the elevator company. 
The elevator company wanted three challenges of its own because it 
claimed adverse interest to the hotel. The Court reviewed the record 
and arguments of counsel and came to the conclusion that the 
defendant's interests were antagonistic. The Court held that it was 
not the intent of the legislature to require clearly adverse parties to 
join in peremptory challenges. The language used by the Court is 
instructive: 
"There are no doubt many cases where the 
defendants are joined, in which one seeks to 
blame the other for the wrong or injury of 
which the plaintiff complains. In such cases 
there is no substantial reason why the 
defendants, for purposes of a peremptory 
challenge, should not be considered as being 
on the same side. But where the record 
indisputably shows that one defendant 
practically admits its own liability, and 
whether it admits it or not, substantial 
grounds appear for such admission, and 
where it further appears that such party is 
seeking to establish liability against the other 
as a foundation for recoupment of damages 
for breach of contract against the co-
defendant, it is an unblushing travesty to hold 
that both parties are on the same side of the 
controversy in the sense intended by the 
statute in question. . . . No right thinking man 
will contend that the hotel company did not 
have the right to seek to charge the elevator 
company with the wrong complained of, if it 
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believe the elevator company was responsible 
for the injury; but that is not the question 
here. The question is: Were they both on the 
same side within the meaning of the statute? . 
. . The statutes which requires the 'parties on 
either side to join' should only be regarded as 
a precaution to the trial court to see that the 
right of severance in challenges shall not be 
permitted, except in cases where it is 
manifest from the very nature of the case 
that even-handed justice requires it." 
Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co,., 249 P. 437, 458 (Utah 1926). 
After a diligent search, the plaintiff has been unable to find 
additional cases on this issue since the 1926 Sutton announcement. 
In fact, the plaintiff could only find once that Sutton had been cited 
by an Alaska court in 1954. 
Plaintiff submits that it is helpful to review the State of 
Wyoming's statute and case law on this point. The Wyoming 
Supreme Court interpreted a Wyoming statute W.S. 1977 Section 1-
11-202 in Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyoming 1981) as follows: 
In determining whether multiple defendants 
constitute one side, consideration must be 
given to the nature of the claim against them 
and to whether defendant's interests are or 
may be antagonistic." at 171. 
In applying this language to the facts in Distad, the Wyoming 
Supreme Court found the defendant's interest were adverse. Distad, 
involves a medical malpractice case with separate acts of negligence 
attributed to each defendant. 
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In applying the general rule of consideration in Sutton to the 
current facts, it is clear that the plaintiff has sued three separate 
parties. The plaintiff has sued William Roger Smith, the van operator 
and the employee of Pro-Tech Restoration dba Stone Carpets. In 
addition to these two parties, the plaintiff has also commenced action 
and filed a claim against the City of Pleasant Grove due to their 
failure to appropriately maintain it's streets, roadways, and signage. 
It is the plaintiffs position that although all three parties1 interest 
are adverse to the plaintiff, that they are not necessarily adverse to 
each other. The most obvious element of this is the employee and 
employer relationship. It is clear that the employee was in the scope 
and course of his employment at the time of the facts and 
circumstances of this collision. In fact, Mr. Jeffs initially represented 
both Pro-Tech Restoration and William Roger Smith in this matter. It 
would seem immensely unfair and inequitable to allow a total of six 
peremptory challenges for the employer and the employee 
defendants in this collision litigation. 
It is also clear that Pleasant Grove's interests are antagonistic 
to the plaintiff in the same identical manner as the defendant driver 
and employer. It is the plaintiffs intention to seek relief from both 
entities, both the City as well as Pro-Tech Restoration and it's 
employee. The plaintiff will leave it to each respective defendant to 
point out what, if any, adverse interests they may have between the 
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City and the carpet company in addition to the general adverse 
interest to the plaintiff, 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff submits that unless the defendants can show they 
are each antagonistic to each other's interest, that they should not be 
allowed three separate peremptories each. It is the plaintiffs 
intention to have their numbers reduced to at least six, and hopefully 
three. In the alternative, the plaintiff would be willing to have the 
total defendants' peremptories reduced to six and allow the plaintiff 
to have an equal number of peremptories. 
DATED this day of nvrv^ 1993. 
LYNN C.HARRIS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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MATTINO CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing on this _23 day of Jix»c<— 1993, 
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P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
Robert L. Moody 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
2525 N. Canyon Road 
Provo, UT 84604 
l^/Z/M^ VWAAAs~ 
Secretai 
& 
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EXHIBIT 2 
TRANSCRIPT, JULY 15, 1993 
1 
1 THURSDAY, JULY 15, 1993 
2 (IN CHAMBERS PRIOR TO TRIAL) 
3 THE COURT: WE'RE MEETING IN CHAMBERS. AND 
4 THE COURT HAS INDICATED ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE, 
5 PLUS THE SUPPLEMENTAL DESIGNATION OF WITNESSES, THAT THAT 
6 MOTION IS DENIED. 
7 THE NEXT WAS A MOTION TO LIMIT DEFENDANTS' 
8 NUMBER OF PREEMPTORY CHALLENGES, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
9 INCREASE THE NUMBER OF PREEMPTORIES PERMITTED BY THE 
10 PLAINTIFF. I'M GOING TO DENY THAT MOTION, BUT INDICATE 
11 TO COUNSEL THAT I AM GOING TO HAVE ONE ALTERNATE JUROR. 
12 AND IF YOU ALL WANT FOUR PREEMPTORIES I'LL GIVE YOU ALL 
13 FOUR, BUT OTHERWISE, ONLY UPON MUTUAL AGREEMENT. 
14 WHAT DO YOU WANT TO DO? DO YOU WANT FOUR FOR 
15 A PREEMPTORY? 
16 MR. HARRIS: THREE PLUS ONE? I THINK SO. 
17 YOUR HONOR, WOULD IT BE APPROPRIATE -- I 
18 DON'T KNOW IF YOU LOOKED AT THAT CASE WE QUOTED ABOUT HOW 
19 THERE'S GOT TO BE A DISPARATE INTEREST SITUATION IN 
2 0 THERE — AND I CLEARLY WILL NOT DISPUTE PLEASANT GROVE 
21 CITY HAS DISPARATE INTERESTS, BUT I'M A LITTLE INTERESTED 
22 IN HOW SMITH AND STONE HAVE DISPARATE INTERESTS. AND MR. 
23 JEFFS' RESPONSE WAS JUST THEY -- NO RESPONSE. SOMEWHERE 
24 ALONG THE LINES IF THERE'S GOING TO BE GROUNDS FOR HAVING 
25 EQUAL PREEMPTORIES EACH, I AT LEAST OUGHT TO HAVE THE 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
2 
1 OPPORTUNITY OF KNOWING EXACTLY WHAT IT IS THAT MAKES THEM 
2 SO DISPARATE IN THEIR CLAIMS WHEN MR. MOODY GETS TO HAVE 
3 THREE AND MR. JEFFS GETS TO HAVE THREE, WHEN IN MANY 
4 RESPECTS IT IS CLOSE TO THAT CASE. IT JUST SEEMS TO ME, 
5 FOR THE RECORD, SO I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT, WE NEED TO 
6 ARGUE THAT OR DEAL WITH IT SO WE CAN ADVANCE OUR ARGUMENT 
7 NOW. 
8 THE COURT: COUNSEL, I FEEL THAT THEY ARE 
9 DISPARATE ENOUGH, JUST BY THE NATURE OF THE CASE, TO 
10 PERMIT IT. I DON'T THINK WE NEED THAT. 
11 THE MOTION OF PLEASANT GROVE CITY TO PROHIBIT 
12 ANY MENTION OF INSURANCE IS GRANTED, AND THE PARTIES 
13 SHOULD BE CAUTIONED NOT TO TALK ABOUT INSURANCE AS AN 
14 ISSUE. 
15 (FURTHER MOTIONS DEALT WITH) 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 I, CREED H. BARKER, CSR, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING 
PAGE TO BE A TRUE AND ACCURATE TRANSCRIPTION OF SAID 
21 PROCEEDING, TAKEN DOWN IN SHORTHAND UPON SAID DATE, AND 
REDUCED TO WRITING THIS 22ND DAY OF DECEMBER, 1993. 
22 
23 
S^ CREEXH.^-^A^KER, CSR 
CREED H. BARKER, CSR 
EXHIBIT 3 
PLAINTIFFS PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION 19 
INSTRUCTION NO. \C\ 
Yon are instructed that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-72(2) 
provides: when more than one vehicle enters or approaches an 
intersection from different highways at approximately the same time at 
the intersection: 
(a) is not regulated by an official traffic control device; 
(b) is not regulated because the traffic control device is 
inoperative; or 
(c) is regulated from all directions by stop signs, 
the operator of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way 
to the vehicle on the right unless otherwise directed by a police officer. 
If you find, after a preponderance of the evidence, that William 
Roger Smith was operating a motor vehicle in violation of the foregoing 
statute, such conduct creates a presumption of negligence. 
EXHIBIT 4 
JURY INSTRUCTION 31 
INSTRUCTION NO. 31 
When two vehicles are approaching an intersection at approximately the same time and 
distance from it, the driver approaching on die right has die right-of-way, and it is the dnty 
of the driver approaching on die left to yield the right-of-way. 
A driver entering an intersection first has the right-of-way. However, a driver may not 
speed up to enter an intersection first, nor may a driver take the right-of-way by entering die 
intersection slightly ahead of another driver. In order for a driver approaching from the left 
to take the right-of-way, that driver must enter die intersection clearly ahead of the driver 
approaching from the right. 
EXHIBIT 5 
JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT 
M. Dayle Jeffs, #1655 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
Pro-Tech Restoration, dba 
Stone Carpets 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 388 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLEY CARRIER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba STONE 
CARPETS, WILLIAM ROGER SMITH, and 
THE CITY OF PLEASANT GROVE, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT 
Civil No. 910400680 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
The above entitled matter came on for trial to a jury with the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding presiding, commencing on the 15th day of July, 1993 and being continued from time 
to time and completing the trial thereof on the 23rd of August, 1993. The matter was submitted 
to the jury on August 23, 1993 on special verdict interrogatories, which were answered in 
pertinent part as follows: 
1. At the time and place of the accident in question and under the 
circumstances as shown by the evidence, was the Defendant William Roger Smith negligent? 
Yes X No 
2. At that time and place of the accident in question and under the 
circumstances as shown by the evidence, was the Defendant, City of Pleasant Grove negligent? 
Yes No X 
3. Only if you marked the answer to Question 1 "Yes", answer this question. 
Was the negligence of William Roger Smith a proximate cause of the accident? 
Yes X No 
5. At the time and place of the accident in question and under the 
circumstances as shown by the evidence, was the Plaintiff, Shirley Carrier, negligent? 
Yes X No 
6. Only if you marked the answer to question 5 "Yes", answer this question. 
Was the negligence of the Shirley Carrier a proximate cause of the accident? 
Yes X No 
7. Considering all the fault which caused the accident at 100%, what 
percentage of that fault was attributable to: 
A. The Defendant, William Roger Smith 40 % 
(Only if you answered "Yes" to Questions 1 and 3) 
B. The Defendant, City of Pleasant Grove % 
(Only if you answered "Yes" to Questions 2 and 4) 
C. The Plaintiff, Shirley Carrier 60 % 
(Only if you answered "Yes" to Questions 5 and 6) 
The totals of A, B, and C must equal 100%. 
The jury was polled and the above-mentioned answers were unanimous. 
The court having directed that a verdict enter in accordance with the jury's answer 
to the special verdict interrogatories, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is entered 
in favor of the defendants Pro-Tech Restoration, dba Stone Carpets, William Roger Smith, and 
The City of Pleasant Grove and against the plaintiff of no cause of action and the complaint of 
the plaintiff is hereby dismissed with prejudice, costs to the defendants in the amount of $ 
to Defendant Pro-Tech Restoration, dba Stone Carpets, $ to 
William Roger Smith, and $ to City of Pleasant Grove. 
DATED and signed this day of August, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
Ray M. Harding 
District Court Judge 
3 
